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TAB A

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE

- 1. During the last half of 1950 Communist China's seaborne imports reached record levels. These imports consisted primarily of raw cotton, chemicals, crude rubber, petroleum products, steel and steel products, metal manufactures, and pharmaceuticals. At least three-fourths of these imports passed through Hong Kong and practically all were carried in non-Communist registered shipping. Seaborne imports into Communist China reached even higher levels during the first half of 1951 and the composition of these imports did not change significantly.
- 2. During the latter half of 1951 there has been a decline both in seaborne imports into Communist China and in the tonnage of non-Communist registered shipping engaged in trade with Communist China. There are several possible reasons for the decline in the seaborne trade of Communist China. Among these are: Western export controls, increased imports from the Soviet Bloc, institution of a system of selective buying by the Chinese Communists and a shortage of foreign exchange resulting from heavy imports in 1950 and the first half of 1951. Information now available does not permit even an approximate estimate of the relative importance of these factors.

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3. A part of the decline in the tonnage of non-Communist registered shipping involved in trade with Communist China has been offset by the diversion of Communist Bloc shipping to carrying Communist China's foreign trade. States of the Soviet Bloc are buying or chartering additional ships for use in this trade.

TAB B


COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN MANCHURIA

- 1. Present Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are due directly to Soviet assistance in terms of equipment, operational procedures, training, and, in many cases, the active participation of Soviet personnel. In assessing such capabilities, the following factors are pertinent:
- (a) Fighter Aircraft. Approximately 525 first-line jet fighters of the MIG-15 type are located in the Mukden-Antung area of southern Manchuria. Approximately 225 additional first-line jet fighters, which are now located in the Peiping-Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Canton areas, could be deployed for operations in the Mukden-Antung area.
- (b) Early Warning. A radar defense system has been installed and set in operation, with the assistance of Soviet radar engineers, technicians, and advisers, which is believed to give practically continuous early-warning coverage from the Manchuria border south to Canton. A visual system supplements the electronic early-warning system.





- (c) Antiaircraft Artillery. Manchurian air defenses include a substantial number of antiaircraft artillery pieces as well as large numbers of automatic weapons. The majority of these are Soviet manufactured 85 mm., 37 mm., and 12.7 mm. pieces. Reports continue to indicate that the total AAA strength is being increased by shipments of Soviet equipment. Heaviest concentrations are located in the Mukden area, Shanghai, and in the vicinity of Canton. AAA defenses appear to be employed for the protection of the industrial area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions in the communications and supply systems. Reports indicate that the AAA defenses include gun-laying radar.
- (d) Aircraft Control. The Communist air defense system in Manchuria has the capability for limited ground-controlled interception.
- 2. Communist air defense capabilities in Manchuria are estimated to be as follows:
- (a) In the Dairen-Mukden-Antung-Harbin area of southern and eastern Manchuria, the Chinese Communists possess a major air defense capability against daylight bombing missions. At night their air defense capabilities would be considerably less.



(b) Communist air defense capabilities in southern and eastern Manchuria are such that considerable losses of US aircraft could be expected, at least initially, during a campaign of systematic air attacks. Under conditions of prolonged air attack, the ability of the Chinese Communists to maintain effectiveness would be in direct proportion to the amount of support which the USSR would render.



TAB C

CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES

- The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 455,000 l. personnel organized into 38 infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 paratroop group, 3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments, and 2 independent battalions. The bulk of these forces is disposed on Formosa; some combat elements are located on Matsu, Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands. The Nationalist Army has no significant number of trained reserves, and under present circumstances its. mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass induction of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly expanded its proposed MDAP. Even in this event, the dependability and effectiveness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the present time, the Nationalist Army is short of some types of ammunition, arms, and other equipment, and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materiel deficiencies, the lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (including the lack of interservice coordination), the combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor.
- 2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combats groups possessing 384 tactical aircraft. Of this total, however, only 121 aircraft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light

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bombers and 86 piston fighters predominantly of World War II design.

Because of the lack of spare parts and improper maintenance
facilities, the combat effectiveness of this force is very poor.

Under conditions of sustained combat, particularly if opposed by
jet aircraft, its capabilities would be reduced to a negligible factor
in a day or two. In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist
Air Force is believed to have the organizational structure and
necessary personnel to absorb and utilize the additional equipment,
including jet aircraft, necessary to make it an effective force.

- 3. The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately 150 miscellaneous craft, the largest of which are 7 destroyer type vessels. Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval opposition, the Nationalists would be capable of transporting up to two divisions in assault by means of orthodox landing craft and following up with five or six divisions lifted by other shipping. While the Nationalist Navy could not, by itself, effectively blockade the Chinese mainland, it could give limited support to a blockade.
- 4. The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping and training these

forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only logistic support for an invasion but substantial air and naval support as well. Even so, Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly be ready for an invasion operation before mid1952, and Chinese Nationalist Forces as a whole are not likely to be ready in sufficient strength for a large-scale invasion operation before 1953. However, certain small units of the Chinese Nationalist Army are already capable of effective employment in small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.

5. In a relatively short time certain selected divisions of the Chinese Nationalist Army could be made effective for rotational service on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese Nationalist Army as a whole could be employed effectively in Korea after a lesser amount of preparation than would be required for a large-scale invasion operation of the Chinese mainland.

TAB D

ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-COLMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN CHINA

A. Their Strength and Location

- 1. The maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout all China which can with any certainty be said to exist at the present time is approximately 175,000. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in unknown numbers, but the utility of this category is and probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in China.
- 2. Active guerrilla forces are located for the most part in inaccessible areas mountainous regions and on Nationalist-held offshore islands. Principal regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River and Canton area, the Kwangtung-Fukien border, the Kwangsi-Kweichow border, Szechwan, the Chekiang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas in the Mongol and Moslem northwest.

B. Their Physical Composition and Condition

3. The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since these resistance forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from

one unit to another. Generally speaking, guerrillas fall into the following categories: (a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whom profess allegiance, but most of whom owe no allegiance, to Taiwan; (b) discontented landlords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret societies, and (e) minority racial and religious groups. The most active and effective units are those in categories (a) and (e).

4. Guerrilla forces suffer from a lack of central direction and coordination, from a relative lack of organization, quite often from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious deficiencies in arms and ammunition, and, perhaps most importantly, from an almost total lack of communication facilities. In addition, guerrilla forces suffer from a lack of adequate food, clothing, and medical supplies.

C. Their Motiviation and Allegiance

5. No single political program unites or inspires the guerrillas economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the basic motivating force behind guerrilla activity at the present time is the struggle for existence and self-preservation.



- 6. Despite Nationalist and independent claims, the Chinese guerrillas are likely for the most part to follow whatever leader and whatever political group can support and maintain them.
- 7. Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is primarily that now being exercised by Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largely ineffectual because of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.
- 8. Independent elements continue to claim a substantial guerrilla potential in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets in being are valid, but this group does not have the resources to maintain itself without outside support.

D. Their Continuing Decline in Strength and Effectiveness

- 9. Chinese Communist countermeasures against dissident elements have been most successful; and, with the further consolidation of control by Peiping and the forming by Peiping of an effective antiguerrilla militia throughout China, guerrilla strength and activity under present circumstances will probably continue to decline.
- 10. The perhaps surprisingly low figure of only 175,000 guerrillas should not be ascribed wholly to the successes of the




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Chinese Communist anti-guerrilla program. This low figure also reflects more accurate US knowledge concerning anti-Communist resistance in Chana than was available when earlier estimates were prepared.

E. Their Present Capabilities

- ll. Anti-Communist guerrillas have at the present time the capability for:
 - (a) Sporadic raids;
 - (b) Occasional sabotage operations;
 - (c) Raids, feints, and diversions against the mainland from the Nationalist-held offshore islands;
 - (d) Providing intelligence concerning Communist China; and,
 - (e) Providing a potential nucleus for a resistance movement in mainland China.
- 12. The guerrillas at the present time do not have the capability to:
 - (a) Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another of the Chinese Communist armies;
 - (b) Seriously interdict Chinese Communist lines of communications or logistic support;



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- (c) Attract to their ranks substantial numbers of defectors from the Communists;
- (d) Significantly aid military operations should a Nationalist invasion be launched in the near future.
- 13. Guerrilla capabilities are unlikely to increase without sizeable outside support and a revitalization of the Chinese Nationalists.

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